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Between Political Inquiry and
Democratic Faith
A Pragmatist Approach to Visualizing Publics
James Johnson
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I presented a much earlier version of this paper to a seminar in the Political Science
Department at The University of Florida. I thank Larry Dodd for arranging that
opportunity and all those who attended for their comments and skepticism. I thank Susan
Orr for very extremely helpful comments on a more recent version.
 
Introduction
1 For the past half century or so political science in the United States arguably has been
characterized by two aims that stand in considerable tension. On the one hand, American
political  scientists have aspired to generate knowledge that might inform democratic
politics and governance. On the other hand, they have sought after a brand of political
science conceived along vaguely positivist lines. The political consequences of this tension
are troubling.
2 Repeatedly, successive schools in American political science have been caught between
desires for research that affirms and assists meaningfully democratic self-governance and
desires for research that develops full causal accounts of politics, usually on a model from
the  natural  sciences.  The  tension  arises  in  part  because  such  causal  accounts  tend
deterministically to deny any consciously self-directed agency to the phenomena they
study.  A  science  of  human  political  behavior  thus  can  seem  to  debunk  the  self-
understandings of  democratic participants and the meaningfulness of  their  conscious
choices. Much of the apparently most “scientific” work in political science has carried
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such a debunking message,  intentionally or not.  Sometimes democratic commitments
have been made to appear foolish in light of the ignorance of voters,  the apparently
inescapable power of economic, military, and professional elites, and the decisive role of
technological, economic, demographic, linguistic, geographic, and climatic forces largely
beyond  conscious  human  control.  Political  scientists  have  implied  that  effective
governance, if possible at all, requires scientific skill and empirical knowledge beyond the
grasp  of  most  citizens.  Hence  the  assignment  of  extensive  governmental  powers  to
experts (like social scientists) has been made to seem preferable. These positions have
frequently been advanced in highly technical language impenetrable to most citizens,
who may therefore decide that politics is beyond them (Smith 1997: 256-7).
3 In  what  follows  I  suggest  that  this  enduring  tension  reflects  an  overly  narrow and
pervasive, if often tacit, positivist conception of the tasks of social and political research.1
I will identify some of the tools at hand – in particular, data graphics - that, approached
in  a  pragmatist  fashion,  might  significantly  mitigate  the  tension  between  scientific
legitimacy and political relevance. In doing so I do not fully characterize an alternative
pragmatist conception of inquiry.  I  merely suggest that a pragmatist approach might
significantly mitigate the tension that informs contemporary political science.
 
Stacking the Deck?
4 A skeptical reader might object at the outset that invoking pragmatism simply is a way of
embracing one side of the predicament I’ve just sketched. For pragmatists often ground
their commitment to democratic politics precisely in a confident – some might claim,
naïve  –  estimation  of  common  individuals  and their  capacities.  This  is  evident,  for
instance, in Dewey who asks:
For what is the faith of democracy in the role of consultation, of conference, of
persuasion, of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which is in the long run
self-corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man
to respond with commonsense to the free play of facts and ideas which are secured
by effective  guarantees  of  free  inquiry,  free  assembly  and free  communication?
(Dewey 1939: 242)
5 But it is true as well of more recent pragmatists. So, for instance, Roberto Unger begins a
recent political manifesto like this:
The World remains restless. It has not despaired of finding a better way to fulfill the
central promise of democracy, which is to acknowledge the constructive genius of
ordinary men and women. (Unger 2009: vii)
6 Yet not all pragmatists readily embrace the democratic faith Dewey and Unger articulate.
One need only think of Richard Posner (2003) among avowed contemporary pragmatists
to see that this is so. But one also can identify pragmatists who apparently demur from
the “democratic faith” much earlier on. In “The Fixation of Belief,” for instance, Peirce
(1877) lays out four ways of settling our beliefs in the face of problematic experience and
the sort of doubt it generates. As is well known, he sketches the “method of tenacity,” the
“method of authority,” the “a priori method,” and the “method of science,” arguing for
the superiority of the latter relative to the other three. There is no need to recount his
argument in detail here. It is instead important simply to note that Peirce is especially
concerned about the method of authority – which consists basically in various coercive
means of  imparting and sustaining political  and theological  orthodoxy.  He concludes
despairingly: “The method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind.”2 The
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distance between Peirce’s pessimistic assessment and the “faith” pragmatists from Dewey
to Unger express seems especially great insofar as Peirce explicitly depicts the method of
authority as an invitation to social, religious and political oppression (Peirce 1877: 16-18,
23). 
7 Peirce’s frank political pessimism – and it is unavoidably political insofar as the problem
of fixing belief plagues not just individuals but communities and that the allure of the
method of authority represents what Peirce (1877: 23) calls “the path of peace,” albeit a
coercively  policed  one,  for  any  such  community  –  might  take  some  contemporary
pragmatists by surprise. For something of a local consensus exists among contemporary
pragmatists that their philosophical commitments regarding, say, meaning, knowledge or
truth, have literally no political implications.3 Peirce likely would have found that stance
puzzling.  After  all,  he  depicts  widespread  inability  or  unwillingness  to  embrace  the
pragmatist commitments of fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism embodied
in the scientific  method as  conducing to  authoritarian politics.  There  is,  then,  some
reason to see him as committed to the converse claim, namely that those who endorse
those commitments are thereby committed too to an anti-authoritarian politics.
8 Regardless of whether Peirce – actually or hypothetically – would draw such an inference,
Dewey surely did. He insisted, for example, that if “the pragmatic idea of truth has itself
any pragmatic worth, it is because it stands for carrying the experimental notion of truth
that reigns among the sciences […]. over into political and moral practices” (Dewey 1911:
110). He subsequently depicted this imperative as the culmination of a more general shift
in the locus of cognitive and intellectual authority in modern societies. 
[T]he pragmatic  conception of  truth […] places  upon men the responsibility  for
surrendering  political and  moral  dogmas,  and  subjecting  to  the  test  of
consequences  their  most  cherished  prejudices.  Such  a  change  involves  a  great
change in the seat of authority and the methods of decision in society. (Dewey 1948:
160)
9 Dewey believed that this shift had largely been accomplished in many domains of human
endeavor, especially those dealing with the natural world. In that respect he differs from
Peirce whose assessment was clearly much less sanguine. That said, Dewey complained
that “men” have proven reluctant to make this change when it comes to confronting
social, economic and political problems.4 And he saw this reluctance itself as a political
problem, the resolution of which is central  to the emergence of a robust democratic
order. 
10 Pragmatists from Peirce onwards have understood that processes of resolving doubt and
establishing reliable belief reside “not in the individual merely, but in the community”
(Peirce 1877:  16).5 Yet,  in general,  pragmatists have paid insufficient attention to the
institutional arrangements necessary to coordinate and sustain those processes. Had they
done so, they might have noticed not just Dewey’s profession of “faith,” but also the
crucially important caveat that he places on his commitment to the democratic ideal. As
Dewey insists:
Democracy is a personal way of life controlled not merely by faith in human nature
in general but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and
action if proper conditions are furnished. (Dewey 1939: 242; stress added)
11 And  those  conditions,  as Dewey  made  clear  in  the  passage  I  cited  earlier,  consist  in
institutional arrangements that can provide “effective guarantees of free inquiry, free
assembly and free communication.” In other words the pragmatist view of knowledge,
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truth, and meaning – properly philosophical concerns – entails in a more or less direct
fashion a concern for political institutions. That is a consequence that pragmatists have
left woefully unexplored. And it is not one I will explore here in any general way.6 For
present  purposes  I  instead wish simply  to  point  out  that  the  pragmatist  approach I
endorse (and to which I refer above) does not so much focus on the “intelligence of the
common man” or “the constructive genius of ordinary men and women” in the abstract
as  on  the  institutions  and  practices  necessary  to  sustain  the  full  exercise  of  that
intelligence or genius. This focus, I suggest, will allow us to mitigate the tension that
characterizes much of contemporary political science.
12 Within  this  broad  terrain  I  adopt  a  quite  particular  focus,  namely  on  the  resources
available  for  communicating  the  specialist  knowledge  that  emerges  from  social  and
political research. I am hardly the first to devote attention to this topic. Dewey indeed
spends  the  latter  chapters  of  The  Public  &  Its  Problems arguing  that  enhanced  and
elaborated institutions and practices of social inquiry and especially the communication
of the results of that inquiry are crucial tools for remedying of the problems besetting
publics in the contemporary world. Likewise – and inspired by Dewey and Phillip Kitcher
(2006) has more recently sketched the outlines of such an institutional arrangement –
what he calls an Inquiry-and-Information System (IIS) – and sketches too the ideals that
should inform the way that system operates. In complex modern societies, he claims, the
components of an IIS are charged with disseminating as well  as with generating and
certifying information and ideas. And a set of ideals – significance and transparency –
govern our assessment  in any given society both of  the components  of  the IIS  as  it
currently exists and operates and the aspirations of those who inhabit that society for
how they might be refined or augmented. By focusing not just on how our practices of
inquiry generate reliable knowledge but also on how such knowledge is disseminated, this
line of pragmatist thinking offers a remedy to the too narrow conception of social and
political research that I noted at the outset.
 
Envisioning Complexity as a Political Problem
13 On a pragmatist view “science, like politics, is problem solving” (Rorty 1998: xxi).7 This
does not mean that either practice can be derived from or reduced to the other. It means
only that, ideally, they are informed by an overlapping family of commitments. We might
read  The  Public  and  Its  Problems as  a  sustained  attempt  to  navigate  the  troubled
entanglement of politics and inquiry in contemporary society. Indeed, Dewey explicitly
claims that the basic problem confronting inchoate publics in contemporary America is
an “intellectual” one that  might be mitigated by finding more useful  ways by which
scientific, and especially social scientific, inquiry can enter in to and inform democratic
politics.
14 Nothing  I  have  just  said  implies  that  pragmatists  embrace  the  vaguely  positivist
conceptions of inquiry that informs much political research. In a well-known passage
from The Public and Its Problems John Dewey offers the following observation:
The prime condition for a democratically organized public is a kind of knowledge
and insight  which  does  not  yet  exist.  In  its  absence,  it  would  be  the  height  of
absurdity to try to tell what it would be like if it existed. But some of the conditions
which must be fulfilled if it is to exist can be indicated. We can borrow that much
from the spirit and method of science even if we are ignorant of it as a specialized
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apparatus. An obvious requirement is freedom of social inquiry and of distribution
of its conclusions. (Dewey 1927: 166)
15 From there Dewey proceeds to discuss the various intellectual and institutional obstacles
that he sees blocking the emergence of this as yet non-existent mode of knowledge. As he
makes clear, however, the emergence of systematic, ongoing social inquiry is important
not so much for its own sake but for its political consequences, for its anticipated impact
on the formation of democratic publics. I do not aim to discuss this larger topic here.
Instead, I want to focus on how and where Dewey concludes his discussion.
16 One aspect of the matter concerns particularly the side of dissemination. It is often said,
and with a great appearance of truth, that the freeing and perfecting of inquiry would not
have any especial effect. For, it is argued, the mass of the reading public is not interested
in learning and assimilating the results of accurate investigation. Unless these are read,
they  cannot  seriously  affect  the  thought  and action of  members  of  the  public;  they
remain  in  secluded  library  alcoves,  and  are  studied  and  understood  only  by  a  few
intellectuals. The objection is well taken save as the potency of art is taken into account.
A technical high-brow presentation would appeal only to those technically high-brow; it
would  not  be  news  to  the  masses.  Presentation  is  fundamentally  important,  and
presentation  is  a  question  of  art.  A  newspaper  which  was  only  a  daily  edition  of  a
quarterly journal of sociology or political science would undoubtedly possess a limited
circulation  and  a  narrow  influence.  Even  at  that,  however,  the  mere  existence  and
accessibility of such material would have some regulative effect. But we can look much
further than that. The material would have such an enormous and widespread human
bearing that its bare existence would be an irresistible invitation to a presentation of it
which  would  have  a  direct  popular  appeal.  The  freeing  of  the  artist  in  literary
presentation,  in  other  words,  is  as  much a  precondition of  the desirable  creation of
adequate opinion on public matters as is the freeing of social inquiry (Dewey 1927: 182-3).
17 While contemporary pragmatists  have devoted considerable attention to the topic  of
social and political inquiry, to the best of my knowledge those discussions neglect almost
completely the crucial importance Dewey assigns here to matters of dissemination and
presentation8.  The  argument  I  sketch  in  this  paper  is  an  initial  (read  tentative,
speculative) effort to spell out some consequences of that neglect.
18 It is perhaps best to start by offering an expansive rendering of Dewey’s claims. Read
narrowly, the passage I’ve just invoked would restrict our concern to “literary” matters. I
think that would be a mistake. And I think there are at least two reasons Dewey and more
contemporary pragmatists should avoid making it. 
19 In  the  first  place,  Dewey  himself  invites  an  expansive  reading  by  speaking  nearly
immediately of the role of “art” more generally. He observes that “The function of art has
always been to break through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness.”
Putting aside the question of whether that is an accurate characterization of the role art
in fact has played in society (which I seriously doubt), he is here speaking not just of
literary genres but of art per se. With respect to the dissemination of inquiry, he then goes
on as follows:
The highest  and most  difficult  kind of  inquiry  and a  subtle,  delicate,  vivid  and
responsive art of communication must take possession of the physical machinery of
transmission and circulation and breathe life into it.  When the machine age has
thus perfected its machinery it will be a means of life and not its despotic master.
Democracy […] is a name for a life of free and enriching communication. It had its
seer in Walt Whitman. It will have its consummation when free social inquiry is
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indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication. (Dewey 1927:
183, 184)
20 It seems clear that Dewey would countenance an expansive reading of his claims about
art as including not merely literary, but visual media. There is, regardless, nothing in his
discussion to preclude such a reading.
21 Second,  it  is  crucial  to  recall  that  Walter  Lippmann  –  arguably  Dewey’s  primary
interlocutor when he wrote The Public and Its Problems – was especially concerned with
vision,  with  the  capacity,  or  lack  thereof,  that  ordinary  men possess  to  see political
phenomena.9 Lippmann opens The Phantom Public with the following passage:
The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back
row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot manage to
keep awake.  He  knows he  is  somehow affected  by  what  is  going  on.  Rules  and
regulations continually, taxes annually, and wars occasionally remind him that he
is being swept along by great drifts of circumstance. 
Yet these public affairs are in no convincing way his affairs. They are for the most
part invisible. […] He lives in a world that he cannot see, does not understand and is
unable to direct. (Lippmann 1927: 3-4)
22 Lippmann, of course, is in many ways charitable toward his fellow citizens. He thinks they
have plenty of good reasons not to focus on public affairs. Citizens rightly are otherwise
preoccupied with their jobs and families and other concerns considerably closer to home.
That, though, is a matter of motivation, of where our interests might most commonly lie. 
23 Lippmann nonetheless is quite clear that public affairs are complex and so obscure in
their own right. It is, on his account, simply very difficult to see the social, political and
economic relations in which we are enmeshed and this,  he thinks, is an invitation to
partiality. 
24 Modern society is not visible to anybody, nor intelligible continuously and as a whole.
One section is visible to another section, one series of acts is intelligible to this group and
another to that (Lippmann 1927: 32).
25 About this Dewey would hardly disagree. Here is his familiar diagnosis of the “the eclipse
of the public” in modern democracies.
26 Indirect,  extensive,  enduring  and  serious  consequences  of  conjoint  and  interacting
behavior  call  a  public  into  existence  having  a  common interest  in  controlling  these
consequences. But the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified
and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences, has formed such immense and
consolidated unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the
resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself. And this discovery is obviously an
antecedent  condition  of  any  effective  organization  on  its  part.  Such  is  our  thesis
regarding the eclipse which the public idea and interest have undergone. There are too
many publics and too much of public concern for our existing resources to cope with. The
problem of a democratically organized public is primarily and essentially an intellectual
problem, in a degree to which the political affairs of prior ages offer no parallel (Dewey
1927, 1926).
27 A few pages later he elaborates on this view, tying the “intellectual” problem he has
identified into the difficulties that complex modern interactions pose for members of
inchoate  publics  who  might  try  to  perceive  how  important,  enduring,  indirect
consequences generate their common interests.
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The local face-to-face community has been invaded by forces so vast, so remote in
initiation, so far-reaching in scope and so complexly indirect in operation, that they
are, from the standpoint of the members of local social units, unknown. Man, as has
been often remarked, has difficulty in getting on either with or without his fellows,
even in neighborhoods. He is not more successful in getting on with them when
they act at a great distance in ways invisible to him. An inchoate public is capable of
organization  only  when  indirect  consequences  are  perceived,  and  when  it  is
possible  to  project  agencies  which  order  their  occurrence.  At  present,  many
consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, but they cannot be
said to be known, for they are not, by those who experience them, referred to their
origins.  It  goes,  then,  without  saying  that  agencies  are  not  established  which
canalize the streams of social action and thereby regulate them. Hence the publics
are amorphous and unarticulated. (Dewey 1927: 131)
28 Members of a public, in other words, often will feel their predicament without accurately
recognizing its  causes  or  consequences.  The difficulty they confront  revolves  around
visibility,  around being able to see their  common predicament as  a  first  step toward
addressing it  in a  concerted way.10 The failure to adequately confront  that  difficulty
results, on Dewey’s view, in apathy, ideological bluster, emotional reaction and, generally,
misdiagnosis of the public and its problems.
29 It is important to be clear here. I am not claiming that Dewey and Lippmann are, after all,
agreed in their assessments of contemporary democracy and its vicissitudes. They are
not.11 Where Lippmann, for instance, emphatically endorses a technocratic solution for
what he takes to be the malaise of democracy, Dewey rightly castigates that proposal as
utopian, denying that it is either warranted or likely to succeed.12 Rather, I am seeking
only to establish that despite their political divergence, both theorists identify problems
of complexity and visibility as obstacles to democratic politics. 13 That, I  believe, affords
initial warrant for the argument that follows.
 
Tools For Revealing Complexity
30 I  want  to  take  up the  problem of  visualizing complex social,  political  and economic
phenomena. Such phenomena are in many cases aggregate ones. Political scientists have
increasingly addressed the uses of graphical representations for analyzing quantitative
data and for conveying the results of their analyses to professional audiences.14 These
valuable and innovative studies tend to focus rather narrowly on the methodology – the
“nuts and bolts” as it were – of constructing this or that sort of graphic. They also tend to
be concerned with communicating with other social scientists or, perhaps, with members
of the legal profession or policy-makers. I want to shift the focus somewhat in order to
highlight several theoretical premises that, I think, sustain these studies and that may
prompt us to adopt a more expansive view of our potential audience. In this way it may
be possible to see how the visualization of complexity – especially as it is embodied in
aggregate  phenomena  –  is  a  key  route  by  which  political  inquiry  can  enter  more
effectively into democratic politics.
31 My initial focus is on the work of Edward Tufte, himself a lapsed political scientist, who
has  explored  with  great  insight  the  cognitive  and  aesthetic  tasks  of  communicating
quantitative information.15 Tufte clearly operates precisely at the junction of visibility
and complexity. He emphatically punctuates the epilogue to the first of his books on the
topic as follows: 
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What is to be sought in designs for the display of information is the clear portrayal
of complexity. Not the complication of the simple; rather the task of the designer is
to give visual access tothe subtle and the difficult - that is, the revelation of the
complex. (Tufte 2001: 191)
32 Tufte offers myriad examples of good and bad design, a set of principles of “graphical
integrity” meant to insure that design variation maps data variation rather than the
reverse, and much advice about how to maximize (within reason) the data-ink ratio in,
and so enhance the efficiency of, visual displays. All of this specific advice, however, is
parasitic on a single underlying commitment, namely to an instrumental view of visual
displays. Tufte endorses this commitment in the introduction to the same volume. “At
their best, graphics are instruments for reasoning about quantitative information” (Tufte
2001: 9,91). Graphs and other sorts of visual display, in other words, are not simply ways
of  representing data,  or conveying information,  or presenting “the facts.” Like other
components of inquiry, they are, on a view that pragmatists will embrace, tools we use to
think with as we attempt to navigate the natural and social worlds. And, as with our
theories, concepts, classifications, measures, and techniques more generally, we typically
assess data graphics according to how well they work in meeting our aims. Virtually all of
Tufte’s particular recommendations, unsurprisingly, revolve around how to create and
refine graphical displays in ways that will enhance rather than hinder our capacity to
think about complex problems we encounter.16
33 In  this  regard,  Tufte,  sometimes  tacitly,  often  explicitly,  endorses  a  problem-solving
approach  to  inquiry that  places  a  premium on  producing  sound  explanations  and
assessing them in terms of their consequences (Tufte 2006: 131; 1997: 27-53).17 And he
breaks problem-solving down into a set of more modest, if still crucially important tasks,
for which visual displays of various sorts can prove useful. As he says:
The  purpose  of  evidence  presentation  is  to  assist  thinking.  Thus  presentations
should be constructed so as  to assist  with the fundamental  intellectual  tasks in
reasoning about evidence: describing the data, making multivariate comparisons,
understanding causality, integrating a diversity of evidence, and documenting the
analysis […] The principles of analytical design are derived from the principles of analytical
thinking. (Tufte 2006: 137)
34 One not-so-obvious way that visual displays can assist our thinking is to prompt us to
address conceptual problems. This often will involve talking about things that remain
unobservable.  So,  for  instance,  Tufte  rightly  notes  that  “understanding  causality”
requires that we identify and trace plausible causal mechanisms (Tufte 1997: 53). Those
mechanisms typically consist in entities and activities that we cannot observe, at least in
any direct sense.18 They are crucially important to social and political inquiry insofar as
without them our “theories” often remain so poorly specified that it is difficult to know
whether whatever data we might have can, in fact, provide evidence for or against the
claims we are making (Tufte 2006: 128-9, 142-3).19 And they are crucial to democratic
politics insofar as our appreciation of indirect consequences is informed by our capacity
to identify and explore sometimes-intricate causal connections.
35 While Tufte’s views seem to underwrite a broadly pragmatist understanding of social and
political inquiry, at least two important concerns remain. First, it is unclear how far Tufte
would push his own views concerning analytical design for the visual display of data and
information  –  whether,  that  is,  he  is  concerned  primarily  about  influencing  policy-
makers or about having an impact on the formation of publics more generally. Second,
there is what may perhaps be a prior question regarding what for present purposes I will
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call the motivations, of both those who create graphic displays and those who view them.
Despite the uncertain priority I will take up these matters in turn.
36 My first concern boils down to whether Tufte would endorse something like Lippmann’s
restricted,  technocratic  view  of  democracy  or  something  more  like  the  expansive
conception of democracy that Dewey endorsed.20 To the best of my knowledge he never
offers his views on the matter one way or the other. Even if, in fact, he would endorse the
former, nothing in particular prevents his views on analytical design from informing a
pragmatist account of the latter sort. In other words, regardless of Tufte’s own political
views, his principles of graphic design do not entail a technocratic vision. Indeed, at least
three features of Tufte’s approach in fact impel him in a democratic direction. 
37 First,  when  diagnosing  the  sources  of  various  shortcomings  in  graphical  practice,
especially the sorts of “chartjunk” that divert attention from the substantive point to the
design  features  of  a  visual  display,  Tufte  repeatedly  identifies  as  perhaps  the  most
important problem the tendency of designers to underestimate viewers, to assume they
are  unsophisticated  and  unable  and  disengaged.21 In  that  sense,  the  principles  of
analytical design Tufte advocates are meant to mitigate the obstacles to clear thinking
that poor graphical practice pose, thereby increasing the likelihood that people might
actually use the displays effectively.22 And in that sense too he seems to share something
resembling  the  confidence  pragmatists  from  Dewey  to  Unger  place  in  the  potential
intelligence of common citizens. Second, Tufte points out that effective visual displays
can accommodate diversity of interest and ability among viewers.
Visual displays of information encourage a diversity of individual viewer styles and
rates of editing, personalizing, reasoning, and understanding. Unlike speech, visual
displays are simultaneously a wideband and perceiver-controllable channel. (Tufte
1990: 31)
38 Insofar as pragmatists insist that the in circumstances of politics,  collective decision-
making must accommodate individuals who express an irreducible plurality of material
interests, ethical commitments and cultural attachments, this feature of visual displays
must  be  seen  as  a  virtue.23 Finally,  Tufte  endorses  a  view  of  communication  that
encourages  designers  to  experiment  with  graphics  and  to  collaborate  with  their
audiences. Here again, he insists that if one views one’s audience as a collaborator, it is
necessary to avoid underestimating them (Tufte 2001: 137).
39 In combination, this set of commitments place Tufte’s views in some proximity to the
“faith” that  Dewey (1939)  repeatedly expresses “in the capacity of  human beings for
intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished.” And that faith, of
course, provides all the grounding Dewey feels necessary for a belief in the possibility of
“creative democracy.” It  hardly is  over-reaching to suggest  that  among the requisite
conditions are effective practices of inquiry and dissemination.
40 A second concern that arises from Tufte’s writings revolves around the positivist impulse
to police the boundaries of scientific inquiry and politics. Tufte prompts us to focus on
the uses of  visual displays,  on who is creating and presenting graphical depictions of
information,  the purpose for which they are doing so,  and the ethical,  aesthetic and
intellectual commitments that inform their enterprise. This is a rather massive topic. It
raises the complex ways that “facts” and “values” are entangled in processes of inquiry
(Putnam 2002). Much of contemporary political science is grounded in a faith – misguided
in  my  view  –  that  we  somehow  can  evade  such  entanglement  by  asserting  a  stark
dichotomy between facts and values.24 Yet Tufte’s concern for the ways aesthetic values
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inform the communication of quantitative data – captured most obviously in the title to
his latest volume Beautiful Evidence – suggests that neither he nor we can embrace such a
dichotomy in any firm way.25 That concern, in turn, is intimately interwoven with his
systematic preoccupation with ethical standards of “integrity” for visual displays and the
“responsibility”  of  those  who  create  and  disseminate  them.26 Tufte,  it  seems,  lends
credence to the view that  the cognitive,  the aesthetic  and the ethical  dimensions of
inquiry  are  entangled  in  thoroughgoing  ways.  Obviously,  we  might  –  for  particular
purposes, at particular points – be able to separate them out. But there is no dichotomy
between facts and values to insulate inquiry from politics. This becomes especially clear
when we consider Tufte’s assessment of particular graphics.
41 Consider Tufte’s discussion of two examples of what he deems excellent graphics and the
purposes for which they were used. The first appears near the start of Beautiful Evidence
(Tufte 2006: 22-3). It is an astonishing blueprint-like diagram of the slave ship Vigilante, a
“terrible grid” that – given the horrors of the middle passage – amounts to “a portrait of
individual suffering multiplied by 347 people and then millions.” Tufte takes it from an
1823 engraving produced by J. Hawkesworth for a British anti-slavery publication. Put
bluntly, among the first exemplar’s Tufte offers us in his most recent work is a 19th
Century political graphic aimed at helping create a public that might actively oppose the
slave trade. This point is brought home by the explicit, very favorable comparison he
draws between Hawkesworth’s engraving and a second data graphic – Charles Joseph
Minard’s map of the Napoleon’s disastrous invasion of Russia.
42 Early on Tufte asserted that Minard’s data-map “may well be the best statistical graphic
ever drawn” (Tufte 2001: 40). At that time, he was preoccupied narrowly with its aesthetic
and cognitive qualities – the efficiency and grace with which Minard captures how time,
distance and temperature conspired to reduce Napoleon’s invading force from nearly half
a million troops to a mere ten thousand – and largely neglected the purposes for which he
drew it. More recently, Tufte has come around to acknowledge that Minard’s map too is a
political graphic, an “antiwar poster” animated by Minard’s horror at the “human costs of
war” and drawn for the purpose of “memorializing the dead soldiers” who met their
demise due to Napoleon’s ambition and folly (Tufte 2006: 134, 136).27 Both Hawkesworth
and Minard,  then,  produced data  graphics,  that,  after  roughly  a  century and a  half,
remain exemplary not just for the graphical integrity they embody but for the political
commitment they convey. As exemplars of the principles of graphic design that Tufte
extols, both also serve not just as displays of information but as instruments with which
those who created them could prompt their audiences to think about large scale political
events  and  from there,  potentially  at  least,  coordinate  an  effective  response  to  the
problems they depict.28
 
Taking Data Graphics to the Streets
43 Tufte’s reflections on visual displays of information and their uses afford a useful point of
departure for contemporary efforts to bring inquiry into democratic politics. This claim
may  well  elicit  skepticism  from  those  who  strike  a  “realistic”  pose  regarding  the
prospects of an expansive conception of democratic publics. For such readers it is (at
least) highly unlikely that we might overcome the distinction between “insiders” and
“outsiders” that underwrites Lippmann’s pessimistic political vision (Hannay 2005: 47-51,
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128-30).  This  is  a  provocative  albeit  commonplace  position.  It  also  is,  in  my  view,
unsustainable. 
44 A  pragmatist’s  initial  impulse  is  to  challenge  the  dichotomy  between  insiders  and
outsiders. While this is a sometimes-useful distinction, it is crucial not to allow critics of
democracy to inflate it into a full-fledged dichotomy trailing in its wake a set of quasi-
metaphysical, ultimately political commitments.29 In the case at hand, Lippmann’s view
would lead us to insist that the political world necessarily consists in two broad, mutually
exclusive,  largely  impermeable  categories  of  actors.  On  the  one  side  are  competing
politicos and the experts on whom they call to rationalize their policies and preferences.
On the other is a disengaged, largely ignorant citizenry. I will not rehearse Lippmann’s
argument. After all, even Dewey conceded that as a description of the actual political
world Lippmann’s portrait was reasonably accurate. What is at issue, however, is whether
the bifurcation Lippmann identifies is,  as he believes,  a necessary feature of complex
modern societies. Dewey surely thought otherwise. There is little reason to suspect that it
is.
45 We might first insist that publics are, as Dewey tacitly concedes in his own usage, plural.
We become members of some public or other on his account insofar as the consequences
of interactions to which we are not ourselves a party impact us in persisting, important, if
indirect  ways.  Any  such public  will  remain  “inchoate”  until  those  who constitute  it
recognize their common interests and coordinate around them. This does not require,
therefore,  that  we ascribe the vast  capacities of  the “omnicompetent citizen” (which
Lippmann found so implausible) to the members of any coordinated public. And while
Dewey rightly stresses the crucial role “representatives” play in coordinating publics,
neither does it require that we subscribe to Lippmann’s bifurcated view of the political
world as unalterably composed of “agents” and “spectators” (Dewey 1927: 34-5, 76-7).
46 It is easy enough too not only to present a compelling counterexample to Lippmann’s
dichotomy but  to  offer  one  where  visual  displays  of  quantitative  information –  data
graphics – played a crucial role in helping coordinate an inchoate public.30 Consider the
emergence of AIDS activism in New York specifically, but across the United States more
generally  during the mid-1980s.  This  was  an emergent,  internally  diverse  movement
whose  members  integrated  inquiry  –  including  epidemiological,  medical  and  social
scientific research – into democratic politics in extremely innovative and effective ways.
The point, in fact, is stronger. AIDS activists not only brought inquiry into democracy, but
also brought a significant measure of democracy to the practice of scientific inquiry. In
the process they both challenged extant structures of religious, media, scientific, business
and  political  authority  and  became,  in  many  instances,  experts  on  the  science  and
treatment of the disease (Epstein 2000). ACT UP, on this view, enacted a sometime volatile
but intensely effective “combination of know-how and unruliness” that contested and
redefined the boundary of inquiry and politics without seeking to efface the difference
between the two domains (Reinhardt 1997: 168, 170).
47 In terms of  concrete demands ACT UP sought  (starting in 1987)  to harangue,  cajole,
shame,  and  ridicule  mainstream  America  –  especially  those  occupying  roles  in  our
political, scientific and medical institutions – into recognizing and responding to the AIDS
epidemic that was decimating not only communities of gay men, but women and racial
minorities and the poor. ACT UP clearly wrestled with the heterogeneous character of the
population susceptible to the disease,  but they were single-minded about their basic,
instrumental goal: “the central issue was getting AIDS treatments out of the NIH and FDA
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bureaucracies and into the bodies of  those who are HIV-infected” (Crimp 1990:  37).31
Arguably a  prerequisite  to such challenges was the formation of  a  public  –  or  more
appropriately an overlapping series of local publics – in precisely Dewey’s sense of the
word. And a primary dimension of that task was to render the epidemic and is sources
visible to an audience – consisting of members of directly effected communities as well as
those who remained relatively insulated – that often could not, but also often actively
refused to see it (Gamson 1989). ACT UP sought to portray AIDS as an epidemic rather
than, for instance, a morality tale or tragic human-interest story by diverting attention
away  from  this  or  that  stricken  individual  and  onto  mind-numbing  statistics  and
obscured causal processes. Graphical displays of quantitative data played a key element in
this strategy (Crimp 1990, 2003). Design professionals, often working in collectives within
umbrella organizations such as ACT-UP, produced a significant number of high quality
data graphics aimed at prompting even more encompassing constituencies to recognize,
identify and mobilize around common interests and concerns. Several features of this
mobilization bear comment.
48 First, as was the case with Hawkesworth and Minard, we are dealing here with distinctly
political graphics that rely centrally on quantitative data. We have simple descriptive
statistics: “AIDS: 1 in 61” referring to the ratio of babies born HIV positive in New York
City and “25% TEST POSITIVE” referring to the population incarcerated by New York
State. Likewise, we have multivariate displays: “The Government Has Blood on Its Hands:
One  Aids  Death  Every  Half-Hour”  or,  as  the  epidemic  intensified,  “[…]  Every  Ten
Minutes.” But the aim here was less to present information than to illuminate, challenge
and deflate the diffuse but potent moral and political norms that sustained the epidemic
(Reinhardt  1997:  173;  Gamson  1989).  Here  again,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  data
graphics  are  not  simply  ways  of  representing  data,  or  conveying  information,  or
presenting “the facts.” Like other components of inquiry, they are tools we use to think
with as we attempt to navigate – and indeed, reconfigure – the natural and social worlds.
49 Thus, a second significant dimension to ACT UP’s visual politics was to not just present
numbers but to address the properly conceptual tasks of reforming classifications and
reformulating causal narratives. For example, we are told: “Women Don’t Get AIDS, They
Just Die From It,” accompanied by the percentage of female AIDS patients who die from
conditions not included in official definitions of the disease. More generally, the AIDS
epidemic, as these graphics represent it, results not from a virus transmitted by ‘deviant’
sexual practices,  but from the unconcern and,  indeed,  active complicity of economic,
political, religious, and media entities, both individual and institutional. Hence: “KISSING
DOESN’T KILL: GREED AND INDIFFERENCE DO.” And “Why is Reagan Silent About AIDS?
What Really is Gong On at the Center for disease Control, the Federal Drug administration
and the Vatican?.” In that sense, by drawing attention to larger causal processes, ACT-UP
shifted the  locus  of  responsibility,  or  sought  to,  from HIV-positive  persons  onto the
business executives, elected officials, bureaucratic functionaries, clergy and journalists
who occupied positions in complicit economic, political, religious, and media institutions.
The most potent logo, after all, identified the political causes of the problem. It reads not
“HIV = DEATH,” but “SILENCE = DEATH.” In so doing, it invited viewers – indeed, invites
them  still  –  to  think  about  the  epidemic  as  a  deep,  broad  “political  crisis”  and  to
transform lethal silence into action that might remedy that problem.
50 Third, one significant dimension of the visual campaigns was the effort to establish that
HIV is not a “gay” disease, and that the epidemic not only impacts individuals without
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discrimination – heterosexuals, women, ethnic and racial minorities, infants, and so forth
– but does so in large numbers. An epidemic, after all, is an aggregate phenomenon. In
other words, here “the public” seeking to identify and articulate its common concerns
was both considerably larger and more heterogeneous than many considered it to be.32
ACT UP campaigns thus had multiple audiences: 
51 “The graphics […] codify concrete, specific issues of importance to the movement as a
whole  or  to  particular  interests  within  it.  They  function  as  an  organizing  tool  by
conveying,  in  compressed  form,  information  and  political  positions  affected  by  the
epidemic,  to onlookers at  the demonstrations,  and to the dominant media.  But their
primary audience is the movement itself. AIDS activist graphics enunciate AIDS politics to
and for all of us in the movement […]. In the end, when the final product is wheat-pasted
around the city, carried on protest placards, and worn on T-shirts, our politics and our
cohesion around our politics become visible to us, and to those who will potentially join
us” (Crimp 1990: 20).33
52 Both enterprises, communicating with those outside the movement and with those in – or
potentially in – it obviously were fraught with conflict and disagreement. And there is no
need to diminish those conflicts or to overstate the movement’s success at surmounting
them (Gamson 1989) to see that ACT UP nonetheless was extremely adept at mobilizing
for its basic purpose of getting “drugs into bodies.”
53 Finally,  it  is  easy  enough  to  see  that  our  theme  of  visibility  is  woven  intimately
throughout the politics of ACT UP. But our second theme – complexity – is central to their
endeavors  as  well.  Aids  activists  confronted  the  intellectual  and  emotional  task  of
grasping  how the  etiology  of  disease,  the  operation of  social  and  moral  norms,  the
functioning of political-economic institutions interacted to threaten and indeed end the
lives of large numbers of men and women. This brings the distinctive features of ACT Up
data graphic into sharper focus. Consider the terms Crimp, in retrospect, uses to appraise
the graphics that ACT UP deployed. 
54 I think that maybe one of the great things that ACT UP was able to do was to figure out
ways  of  putting  a  certain  complexity  into  sloganeering.  Silence  Equals  Death  is  an
extremely vague, and at the same time, extremely resonant image text, that, I mean, the
way I wrote about it in AIDS Demo Graphics was that it was partly because one doesn’t
necessarily immediately know what it means; what that pink triangle is, for example; why
it’s upside down, in relation to the way it was historically used; how it was historically
used.  That’s not all  right there.  And yet,  it  became incredibly resonant for that very
reason. So I think that there are ways, graphically and textually, to constitute a certain
complexity. And I think that that was one of the achievements of the graphic and other
representational work that ACT UP did (Crimp & Shulman 2007: 40).
55 On his  account  AIDS activists  used graphics  in much the way Tufte  suggests,  not  to
simplify  but  rather  to  reveal  complexity.  This  is  true  not  just  insofar  as  ACT  UP’s
graphics, for instance, incorporated numbers, highlighted the common threat to diverse
populations,  and contested common ascriptions  of  causality.  It  is  true too,  as  Crimp
intimates, precisely insofar as the group’s defining logo establishes equivalence (literally
mathematical) between two abstract, seemingly disparate concepts.
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Conclusion
56 Many of the problems to which politics is addressed consist of aggregate phenomena –
not just  elections and budgets,  but wars,  migrations,  famines,  and so forth.  (ACT UP
explicitly draws comparisons between the AIDS crisis and both war and genocide). And
many  of  the  difficulties  that  members  of  democratic  publics  confront  consequently
demand the ability to grasp the sorts of complexity that large number pose. For “realists”
like Lippmann and his intellectual progeny this demand is disabling. They presume that
ordinary men and women are incapable of such vision. And they marshal the findings of
social  and  political  research  to  bolster  their  claims.  Regardless  of  their  intentions,
therefore,  political  scientists  risk  contributing  to  a  self-confirming,  anti-democratic
politics.
57 Dewey formulates the basis for a pragmatist reply to this predicament. “Capacities” he
reminds us “are limited by the objects and tools at hand” (Dewey 1927: 210). I have, by
offering a pragmatist interpretation of on Tufte’s theoretical analysis of data graphics
and the visual politics of ACT UP, sought to indicate what such tools look like and how
they have in fact and might in the future continue to operate to sustain a democratic
relation between politics and inquiry. I make no pretense that my argument is definitive.
It is instead more of a provocation, a challenge to political scientists to reconsider the
tension that, as I noted at the start, besets their discipline.
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NOTES
1. My own diagnosis of this tension suggests that, to a considerable extent, our contemporary
predicament reflects  the complex,  distinctive ways that  positivism inflected the discipline of
political  science  in  the  United  States  in  contrast  to  the  way  the  discipline  formed  in  other
countries. The details of this historical process are beyond the scope of the present paper. For
relevant background see Hauptmann 2005, and Adcock & Bevir 2010.
2. Peirce issues this as much as an accusation as a description: “For the mass of mankind, then,
there is perhaps no better method than this. If it is their highest impulse to be slaves, then slaves
they ought to remain” (Peirce 1877: 23, 18).
3. See for instance, Posner (2003: 44, 55), and Rorty (1998: 228-43). 
4. This is a recurrent complaint in The Public & Its Problems (Dewey 1927: 101, 169, 175). Compare
his subsequent remarks on the displacement of religious authority by science (Dewey 1934: 31-2,
74f). One might argue that subsequent developments make him look overly sanguine. But Dewey
would reply that the resurgence of religiously based conviction is, in large part, a symptom of
our failure to persevere along the path of inquiry.
5. Compare: “But in fact, knowledge is a function of association and communication; it depends
upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties
of effectual  observation,  reflection and desire are habits acquired under the influence of the
culture and institutions of society, not ready-made inherent powers” (Dewey 1927: 158).
6. I have done so at length elsewhere. See Knight & Johnson (2007, 2011).
7. For two a more general depiction of science as a problem solving activity see Laudan 1981. And
for a recent disagreement on whether social inquiry is properly characterized in problem solving
terms see the exchange between Shapiro (2004) and Norton (2004). Shapiro defends a “problem
driven”  conception  of  inquiry  in  contrast  to  at  the  “method  driven”  approach  he  believes
dominates much of political science. As is common with conceptual fashions in the discipline,
this one risks being inflated into a dichotomy that will stymie rather than further understanding
just insofar as it neglects the extent to which science progresses by surmounting methodological
problems. 
8. Recent discussions of social and political and social inquiry from a pragmatist vantage point
include Knight and Johnson 1999, Topper 2000, Festenstein 2001, and Johnson 2006.
9. On  Dewey  and  his  debate  with  Lippmann see  Westbrook  (1991:  275-318)  and  Ryan  (1995:
201-20).
10. This, of course, might well involve finding ways either to sustain certain sorts of indirect
consequences that they deem beneficial or to mitigate consequences they deem negative.
11. For an updated version of something resembling Lippmann’s view see Hardin 2009. Empirical
political scientists, of course, have made much over the years about the putative ignorance of
regular citizens. I will not pursue that debate here other than to note two plausible avenues of
response to skeptics. 
First, I will note that the matter hardly has been settled in the favor of ‘realists.’ The authors of
one recent review insist that “despite ongoing concerns about the ignorance and irrationality of
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voters, a growing body of recent work shows that the average citizen may be more informed than
initially thought” (Wlezien & Soroka 2007: 812). 
Second, and more ambitiously, a pragmatist might sidestep the entire debate as it is currently
framed.  She  might  instead  challenge  the  presumption  that  survey  instruments  as  typically
deployed are a reliable means of ascertaining public opinion or knowledge on political matters.
For an argument of this sort see Sanders 1999.
12. For  an  extension  of  Dewey’s  skepticism  about  technocratic  arrangements  see  Knight  &
Johnson 1999.
13. This is not the place for a theoretical examination of the vagaries surrounding the notion of
complexity. For present purposes the following conception will suffice: “Complex outcomes are
neither simple patterns nor completely random. They are longer, interesting structures.  This
approach gives us an exclusionary test for complexity. Complex outcomes are those that cannot
be classified as equilibria, simple patterns or random. This approach works pretty well” (Page
2011: 27).
14. See Jacoby 1997, 1998; Epstein, Martin & Schneider 2006; Epstein, Martin & Boyd 2007; and
Kastellec & Leoni 2007. In a related vein, Brady 2011 has championed the importance of spatial
diagrams in political inquiry.
15. To date Tufte has self-published four volumes on what he calls “analytical design” (Tufte
1990, 1997, 2001, 2006). The relevant secondary literature on Tufte’s work is sparse. In particular,
his views seem to have generated virtually no sustained discussion in political science. This is
true even of the work mentioned in the immediately preceding footnote. See, however, Grady
2006, and Zachary & Thralls 2004. 
16. “Here it is enough to note that notions, theories, systems, no matter how elaborate and self-
consistent they are, must be regarded as hypotheses. They are to be accepted as bases of actions
which test them, not as finalities. To perceive this fact is to abolish rigid dogmas from the world.
It  is  to  recognize  that  conceptions,  theories  and  systems  of  thought  are  always  open  to
development through use. It is to enforce the lesson that we must be on the lookout quite as
much for indications to alter them as for opportunities to assert them. They are tools. As in the
case of all tools, their value resides not in themselves but in their capacity to work shown in the
consequences of their use” (Dewey 1948: 145). Compare Laudan (1990: 102-6) and Johnson (2006,
2010).
17. At times, Tufte is inclined to talk about the aim of inquiry as discerning “Truth.” Among
pragmatists  the  intimate  relation of  truth and inquiry  is  both commonly  acknowledged and
highly contested. For instance, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Cheryl Misak and Robert Brandom
each offer sophisticated but quite distinct formulations of the relationship. Following Tufte down
this path is beyond the scope of this paper. For a reliable tour of the terrain see Bernstein 2010.
18. On this point see Johnson 2006, 2010, and the large body of prior work on which those papers
build.
19. On the larger point made here see Johnson 2002, 2003. 
20. For  such a  pragmatist  conception  of  democracy  see  Knight  & Johnson 2007,  2011.  Tufte
himself has recently taken a post in Washington as an adviser to the Recovery Accountability and
Transparency Board, which is the federal government outfit charged with keeping track of where
the economic stimulus money has gone. See Cohen 2010, and Yaffe 2011. The latter refers to
Tufte as “the graphics guru to the power elite,” hence capturing one possibility.
21. “Worse is contempt for our audience, designing as if readers were obtuse and uncaring, In
fact, consumers of graphics are often more intelligent about the information at hand than those
who  fabricate  the  data  decoration.  And  no  matter  what,  the  operating  moral premise  of
information design should be that our readers are alert and caring; they may be busy, eager to
get on with it, but they are not stupid. Clarity and simplicity are completely opposite simple-
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mindedness.  Disrespect  for  the  audience  will  leak  through,  damaging  communication”  Tufte
(1990: 34). See also Tufte (2001: 79-87, 136-7). Compare Epstein et. al. 2006, 1851, 1861-4.
22. Tufte, clearly, is making an aesthetic judgment as well as an empirical claim. Both aspects of
his position are contestable. For some flavor of the discussion surrounding what he calls “chart
junk” (purely ornamental, typically distracting features of a graphic) and its consequences see:
Scott Bateman et al. 2010. “Useful Junk? The Effects of Visual Embellishment on Comprehension
and Memorability of Charts.” Accessible at [hci.usask.ca/uploads/173-pap0297-bateman.pdf] and
Stephen Few, 2011, “The Chart Junk Debate,” which is available at [perceptualedge.com/].
23. On the circumstances of politics so conceived and their implications for democratic theory
see Knight & Johnson 2011. 
24. In his presidential address to the Southern Political Science Association, Bond (2007, 899)
offers a recent, fervent profession of this faith: “The beginning of scientific inquiry is the fact/
value dichotomy.” He places this claim first among the factors he takes to be the “key elements”
of  the  scientific  method.  For  recent,  more  or  less  dissenting  views  see  Mihic,  Engleman  &
Wingrove 2005, and Gerring & Yesnowitz 2006. 
25. Compare the stress Epstein et al. (2006: 1847-51) place on “clarity,” “vividness,” and “impact”
all of which are values.
26. “For Tufte, aesthetics is linked inextricably to moral and political issues as well as cognitive
ones, and this is the master theme that flows through his books” (Grady 2006: 236). Crucially,
Tufte  ascribes  responsibility  not  only  to  the  purveyors  of  graphics  but  also  to  those  who
constitute their audience (Tufte 2006: 141). 
27. Tufte is somewhat less effusive of late, referring to Minard’s map only as “one of  the best
statistical graphics ever” (stress added). He nonetheless relies on it as the sole vehicle for his
exposition of “The Fundamental Principles of Analytical Design” (Tufte 2006: 122-39).
28. As a more contemporary example here one might consider Sutcliffe (2002), which actually
offers 123 graphics that capture one or another dimension of problem of inequality announced in
the  book’s  title.  Sutcliffe  explicitly  announces  his  debt  to  Tufte  in  the  introduction.
Unfortunately,  the small  paperback,  published by a left-wing press,  hardly approximates the
production values that would make the graphics especially powerful.
29. Thus Dewey (1948: xxxi), for instance, decries “the whole brood and nest of dualisms which
have,  upon  the  whole,  formed  the  ‘problems’  of  philosophy.”  As  Putnam  reminds  us  such
dichotomies tend to divide the world categorically while “ordinary distinctions have ranges of
application and we are not surprised if they do not always apply” (Putnam 2002: 11).
30. Although ACT UP has  declared its  graphics  to  be  in  the public  domain,  they are  in  fact
controlled  by  the  New  York  Public  Library,  which  charges  significant  fees  of  permission  to
reproduce  the  images.  Readers  can  find  the  ACT  Up  archive  by  searching  for  “ACT  UP”  at
[digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/index.cfm]. In addition, Crimp (1990) reproduces many of the
graphics I discuss below.
31. The acronyms Crimp uses stand for the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug
Administration,  both  Federal  government  agencies.  It  is  important  to  note  that,  in  their
confrontations with these agencies, AIDS activists were instrumental, for instance, in altering
disease  classifications  and  experimental  treatment  protocols  in  ways  that  expedited  the
availability of drugs (Epstein 2000).
32. On the significant tensions and difficulties involved here see Gamson 1989.
33. Reinhardt (1997: 174) nicely this point.
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ABSTRACTS
In  the  post-War  decades  political  science  in  the  United  States  has  been  animated  by  two
seemingly incompatible aims. On the one hand, the discipline is committed to scientific inquiry
interpreted in largely positivist  terms.  On the other hand,  the discipline aspires  to  generate
knowledge  that  might  improve  democratic  politics.  I  start by  sketching  pragmatist
interpretations of social and political inquiry, of democratic politics,  and of how the two are
related. Problems of complexity and visibility emerge as central to those interpretations. I then
indicate how Edward Tufte’s theoretical analysis of data graphics and the visual politics of the
aids activist group ACT UP offer examples of how it is possible to envision complex social and
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